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Mirroring misogyny in Hell Chosŏn. Megalia, Womad, and Korea’s feminism in the age 
of digital populism  
 
Youngmi Kim 
University of Edinburgh 
 
Abstract 
In recent years digital populism has emerged in South Korea as a new type of political 
behaviour, marked by the political use of the internet as both a form of political participation 
and an instrument of mobilization. Technological advances and the diffusion of social media 
have enabled social polarization, rooted in post-Asian Financial Crisis neoliberal policies, to 
take on a new, more intense, emotional and radical dimension in the virtual environment. The 
article examines a case study of an online conflict over the issue of misogyny in 2015-2016 to 
reflect on how a group of online feminists, namely Megalia and its splinter off-shoot Womad, 
have used the new media as a terrain for challenging the pervasive misogyny in Korean society. 
As the article zooms in on the online activists’ strategy of mirroring, it highlights how the 
experiences and worldviews of members of both groups are rooted in identity politics and 
argues that the understanding of this online conflict should be embedded in similar global and 
national socio-economic processes. Lastly, the case study also identifies some of the challenges 
that online feminism has encountered in Korea.  
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Populism is, as Mudde aptly put it, the Zeitgeist of the 21st century. i Populism offers a vision 
of politics and society based on a clear and antagonistic dichotomy between the “pure people” 
and the “corrupt elites”.ii Among the features of contemporary populist manifestations is the 
extensive reliance on technology. The rise of Web 2.0, with the emergence of new internet 
services such as social networking websites like Facebook, Twitter, and Kakaotalk in Korea, 
have created opportunities for more near-instantaneous un-mediated communication. Populist 
movements pre-date the internet, of course, but social media represents the glue between offline 
and online realities. 
South Korea offers a particularly suitable ground for exploring the relationship between online 
and offline activism, and more generally the rise of digital populism,iii which Kim defines as 
“a new type of political behaviour marked by the political use of the internet as both a form of 
political participation and an instrument of mobilization”.iv As examined elsewhere, the ties 
between internet and politics in Korea date back to the Roh Moo-hyun presidential campaign 
of 2002, when young campaigners effectively pushed Roh to the presidency.v Months-long 
street protests (candlelight vigils) in 2016 and 2017 were enabled by social media, where a 
diverse leaderless movement took the streets against the then president Park Geun-hye, 
ultimately leading to her ousting and impeachment.  
The context for this lies in the combination of growing economic inequalities and deepening 
social polarization, which has led Koreans to refer to the current historical moment as "Hell 
Chosŏn",vi as the socio-economic predicament of many bears some similarities to the class-
based society of the Chosŏn era. Socio-economic inequalities and the ensuing polarization have 
received the lion’s share of scholarly attention among scholars of South Korean society and 
economy.vii The dichotomy between the elite and the people, and the resentment of the latter 
towards the former has been well covered in the scholarship on populism.viii Alongside this 
“vertical” dichotomy, a second, horizontal dichotomy stands out as equally important. The 
focus on horizontal dichotomies between groups, each claiming to represent the “real people”, 
is especially relevant to the Korean context. ix The integration of Korea in the global economy 
and the neo-liberal reforms that followed the Asian Financial Crisis generated sharp socio-
economic inequalities. These inequalities have a strongly gendered dimension. In Korea this 
has taken the form of misogynistic attitudes among groups of young Koreans directly affected 
by the above-mentioned global and national processes. While the origins of misogyny arguably 
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date back centuries,x in a patriarchal and Confucian society like Korea’s,xi the question of why 
this phenomenon intensified in the 2010s has not yet been subject to scholarly scrutiny.xii  
In this article I examine how one particular group of Korea’s online feminists adopted the 
strategy of digital populist activists to counter the diffusion of misogyny in a virtual 
environment. Empirically, the paper zooms in on the online feminist movements Megalia and 
its splinter group Womad. I detail how online feminist groups responded to the misogyny of 
radical-right groups such as ILBE by examining their origins, aims and strategies. The article 
highlights the centrality of the mirroring strategy as a tool deployed by young feminist netizens 
as they expose the misogyny pervasive in society and, in particular, counter the actions of ILBE. 
ILBE and Megalia/Womad were two antagonistic websites, one for far-right male 
misogynystic activists (ILBE) and the other which grouped radical feminists (first Megalia and 
later Womad too). Megalians started to attack Ilbe’s pervasive misogyny through a strategy o 
mirroring. Every derogatory expression was bounced, mirrored with a similar derogatory 
expression of men as shown in table 1 below. 
In this way, the article makes a three-fold contribution to the literature. First, the case study of 
Megalia and Womad and the 2015-2016 online misogyny/counter-misogyny feud moves 
beyond the typically ideographic single-case discussions of online feminist movements in 
Korea. Rather, the article examines the dialectical relationship between Megalia and Womad 
on the one hand, and Ilbe on the other, by examining how online feminist activists took on 
online misogynists in practice. In the end, the success of Megalia was mixed: their voices were 
heard in society, but the strong message and the vulgar and often violent language proved 
polarising and divisive. Second, while acknowledging the differences where they exist, I bring 
the two literatures on populism and online feminism in conversation by examining, in tandem, 
the rise of digital populism on the one hand, and the misogyny and the mirrored misogyny, on 
the other. While the rise of online feminism, also in the Korean context, has received attention 
in the media and communications scholarshipxiii, in this paper I contend that our understanding 
of the rise of online radical feminism and the feud with Ilbe benefits from integrating the 
analytical tools that are typically applied separately to the two movements. While 
acknowledging that the two strands of literature are not usually natural “bedfellows”, Megalia 
and Womad’s online backlash and their strategy of mirroring were successful because they 
could exploit and leverage the strong divisions within Korean society. Populism has thus far 
focused on the “people vs. the elite”, and “us vs. them” dichotomies and adopt strongly 
antagonistic, even vulgar strategies to have their voices heard. The Megalians mounted an 
attack against males and the patriarchal establishment, hegemonic in Korean society and 
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deployed mirroring strategies against pervasive misogyny. Third, Korea constitutes an 
especially suitable and novel vantage point to explore the rise of populism beyond the West,xiv 
both because of the manifold manifestation of populist politics and the early adoption of new 
tools made available to politics by technological innovation. The article uses several qualitative 
methods, including the analysis of media archives and audio video contents and digital 
ethnography. It uses data from Megalia’s remaining Facebook group, websites, and other 
publicly available material on YouTube and social networks. Statistical data are used to provide 
a more general overview of socio-economic inequality in contemporary South Korea. 
To be clear, I imply no moral equivalence between Korea’s digital feminism, even in its radical 
form, and the misogynistic groups that have proliferated online and offline. I do, however, 
contend, that an analysis of both groups in tandem is useful, as it allows us to zoom out of the 
specific, intense, but relatively short-lived online feuds between them to capture the broader, 
structural and long-term processes that have engulfed Korean society and debates therein. 
Those developments help shed light on how Korean culture has adjusted, struggled, and 
transformed at a time of rapid socio-economic transformation and the often vicious debates 
that have emerged and spread as a result of an acceleration in digital communication. 
Naturally, there are also some limitations as to what this article aims to or can do. This is not a 
summary of the history of Korea’s feminism. I limit my analysis to a relatively short period in 
time, between 2015 and 2016 and, empirically, only focus on the interaction between online 
misogyny and the efforts to counter it through a mirroring strategy. This dialectic approach is 
useful as it allows me, first, to show how neither of these phenomena should be examined as a 
discrete event or a stand-alone issue, but rather as a dynamic co-constitutive relationship, a 
form of identity politics enabled by technology and historically embedded in the neo-liberal 
era. And second, to highlight  the effects neo-liberalism has engendered in Korean society. The 
article thus provides a useful context to understand the emergence of Korea’s own metoo 
movement, just as the conflict between ILBE and Megalia/ Womad seemed to be dying down. 
As Korea’s  metoo has received attention elsewhere, it is not included in this analysis.xv  
The article is structured as follows. First, it contextualizes the analysis of the interaction 
between early conquests by the movement for women’s rights and gender equality, and the 
social backlash they have encountered. Next, the article turns to the origins of the Megalia 
group and the aims of its members. The central section of the article discusses Megalia and 
Womad as illustrative case studies of the rise and challenges that Korea’s digital feminism 
encountered. Two issues are emphasized. First, globalization and the structural transformation 
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of Korea’s economy, which also called into question social norms and expectations, adding a 
gendered dimension to such broader processes. And second, the role of technology in 
deepening polarization and identity politics of which the Megalia-ILBE conflict is a case in 
point.  
 
Context: The battle for gender equality and women’s rights and the social backlash 
The Internet plays an influential role in South Korea’s economy (through online shopping), 
social life (the Kakaotalk mobile application is virtually on everyone’s phone), and politics. It 
has done so for about two decades, starting from the campaign that led to the election of Roh 
Moo-hyun as president in 2002 to the candlelight vigils in the spring of 2008 and more recently 
those in the winter of 2016-2017 in the wake of the Choi Soon-sil scandal that led to the 
impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye. With an internet penetration of 96% in 2018, 
Korea is among the world’s most wired societies. xvi  Social media applications (SNS) tie 
together government and the citizenry, as was shown – with success, despite concerns over 
surveillance and privacy – during the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic crisis. xvii  Contact-tracing 
through mobile apps has become one of the crucial tools for the authorities to map the spread 
of the disease and keep it under control without resorting to lockdowns, and allowing ordinary 
life (and the economy) to continue.xviii Despite such a positive experience, though, a paradox 
is becoming increasingly apparent in South Korea: the more widespread access to information 
technology becomes, the more  citizens feel the urgency to express themselves and share, 
unreflexively, freely and in an unmediated or unmoderated manner, all sorts of views on all 
sorts of issues. This is certainly a positive development in cases where e-government links 
government and citizenry and where political campaigns recruit and mobilize those who would 
not otherwise take part in politics, let alone vote. However, the controversy and verbal violence 
that has accompanied online debates, as evidenced by the rise in fake news and hate speech 
online, shows a far less benign face of this phenomenon. A highly developed information 
technology environment offers fringe elements with radical views the opportunity to recruit 
like-minded people and mobilize them, while fuelling social antagonism and witch-hunting 
behaviour against “the other”, viewed as illegitimate and an outsider in their supposedly “pure” 
and “homogeneous” society.xix 
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As I show in this section, misogyny and the battle over gender roles in Korea has gone through 
various phases over the past decade: an initial success of feminist groups  in enacting important 
legislative changes  was followed by a backlash  and the growing anti-feminism of certain 
groups of young men considering themselves as the victims of  feminists’ institutional 
achievements. This has been met and countered by a mirroring of misogyny by young feminists, 
many of whom were born in the 1980s.xx The 1980s generation started to enter university in 
1997 or 1998, when South Korea’s economy was ravaged by the Asian Financial crisis and the 
country had to accept neoliberal policies such as flexible labour market and opening the 
hitherto protected domestic market to foreign companies. These, among other policies, 
accelerated the trend towards the globalization of the Korean economy and the polarisation of 
society through widening gaps in both wealth and income inequality. This is the time when 
imported luxury goods became more readily accessible in Korean department storesxxi right at 
a time when their affordability among the more general population declines as living standards 
and salaries plummeted. I briefly review the beginning of the movement in this section, while 
the rise of Megalia is discussed separately in the next section.  
 
Feminism in the neo-liberal age: rise and early conquests 
The origins of Korea’s feminist movements pre-date both the country’s economic development 
and the reforms that followed the Asian Financial Crisis. However, understanding the 
contemporary debate over online misogyny necessitates a brief historical review of that period 
and the social and economic changes which the neo-liberal reforms engendered in Korean 
society, as well as their gendered dimensions. South Korea’s state-led economic development 
enabled a concentration of wealth around the large industrial conglomerates (Chaebŏl). When 
those multinational corporations were mired in the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the new 
progressive government led by Kim Dae-jung implemented the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)’s restructuring programme. xxii  Many Chaebŏl went bankrupt or merged with other 
companies, such as Daewoo, Hanbo, and Kia. The restructuring programme enforced by the 
IMF led to mass layoffs and the introduction of a flexible labour market. Many workers in their 
forties or fifties took “honourable retirement”; in reality, they were fired. Younger people 
started to be employed on short-term contracts. Securing indefinite contracts became extremely 
difficult in Korea, especially for the younger generations.  
It was during this time of economic crisis under the first progressive democratic government 
(1998-2003) that the feminist movement, and more generally the movement for women’s rights, 
achieved a number of early victories, such as abolishing the additional points in the 
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government’s civil service exam that Korean men had hitherto benefited from for performing 
military service in 2000. Further, a Ministry of Gender Equality and Family was established in 
2001.  
As the labour market became slightly fairer for women, competition between men became 
fiercer. Competition for so-called 3D jobs (dirty, dangerous, and demeaning), such as cleaning 
public toilets or collecting trash, soared. At some point in 2001, the application ratio for these 
positions was 4:1, reaching up to 7:1 in cities like Daegu, with applicants including many 
university graduates. The trend continued up to a peak of 23:1 for positions of public 
cleaners.xxiii Despite the low prestige of such positions, this form of public employment comes 
with job stability and various benefits including vocational insurances and pension. While a 
saturated job market left limited alternatives to many university graduates, paving the way for 
resentment and anger, the Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003-2008) introduced a new law in 
2005 abolishing the family registry system which had previously only allowed a father,  a 
husband, or a son to be the head of a household. Before this law was abolished, women were 
either included in a family registry which had their father as the head of the household or, after 
marriage, they were moved to their husband’s family registry. The traditional family registry 
was the most vivid illustration of the secondary position that Korean women occupied in 
society. This was also the time when local women’s rights campaigners encouraged young 
Korean women to use their father’s and mother’s family names equally. Many feminists used 
both their parents’ family names followed by their first names in the early 2000. While most 
of the public understood that the overall environment was becoming fairer to women, there 
were also nationwide demonstrations against the new law. The early 2000s were times when 
local feminists, and more generally the battle for gender equality, reaped a number of successes. 
The expressions “Alpha girl”, symbolising students that were attaining high grades in school, 
and “Gold Miss”, referring to single women earning high wages and enjoying professional 
careers became popular expressions in Korean society.  
 
Misogyny and the anti-feminist backlash: The rise of ILBE 
In 1999, the Constitutional Court ruled that the additional points awarded to Korean men when 
taking government exams was unconstitutional.xxiv This led to a very vocal backlash by young 
men who felt they were being “disadvantaged” by this change. Public anger manifested itself 
through the increasingly widespread use of derogatory expressions towards women such as 
“Kimch’inyŏ” (Kimchi woman) or “Seongkoe” (Plastic surgery monster). This was the start of 
the contemporary wave of misogyny across society. ILBE (the “Daily Best”) was the largest 
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internet humour community, akin to a Facebook group, created in 2010,xxv and would later 
become notorious for fomenting misogyny; it was ultimately was closed down in November 
2015 by DC Inside (dcinside.com), a popular web-platform similar to Facebook in terms of its 
main social network functions, as its members stood accused of crimes against women.xxvi 
ILBE is an example of the male-solidarity coalitions that emerged in response to the 
“victimization” of men engendered by legislative reform. The leader of one such NGO was 
Sŏng Chaeki, a vocal opponent of the discrimination against men, enraged by – among others 
– the fact that Korean women had the option of female-only subway carriages or could sit in 
dedicated rooms in public places such as libraries. Sŏng’s view was that men were victims of 
selfish feminists. Evidence for his claims, according to him, were that men still had to do 
military service, were expected to be breadwinners in the family, and still had to conform to 
social norms demanding that men pay more for women while dating or in marriage. Sŏng’s 
group became a vocal advocate for gender equality in reverse. As the new victims, men had to 
defended their rights. A comedian on the TV programme ‘Manyŏsanyang (Witch-hunting)’ 
commented to a colleague on the show in April 2015: "I don’t like wild women speaking loud 
and thinking hard". xxvii  This sparked a furious reaction online, as feminists demanded a 
response in May 2016.xxviii The expression went viral and started  appearing on T-shirts, bags, 
key-chains, banners, and even book titles later. Due to the massive backlash, the comedian was 
asked to step down from the show, as his earlier misogynistic expressions in podcasts and TV 
programmes began to circulate. Feminist scholarship has approached these events as 
aggravating young men’s loss of feeling, frustration, and anger.xxix Sŏng Chaeki was very vocal 
about this online and also on TV shows, as he emphasised men’s burden in  society at a time 
when they  were suffering from financial losses over government support for the jobless and 
the homeless. Despite taking part in various TV programmes, Sŏng tweeted that he needed 
100,000,000 won (just under 100,000 USD) to cover the costs of his male solidarity NGO.xxx 
To fundraise, he decided to stage a performance where he would jump from a bridge into the 
Han River in Seoul. He publicly pledged to return the sum, which he referred to as a loan. 
However, the performance ended in tragedy as, after not resurfacing after the dive, Sŏng was 
found dead a few days later on the river bank.xxxi His death rapidly  became a social issue with 
attention focusing on the lack of funding for his NGO (and similarly-minded ones) and his 
views of men as victims in a Korean society allegedly dominated by feminists. Sŏng’s views 
and the tragic nature of his death resonated across certain groups where young male students 
could not compete with their female peers at school, or felt that the school environment was 
being run by their fellow female class-mates. A teenager who considered Sŏng Chaeki as his 
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personal hero declared he would join Islamic State as he "could not stand Korean women".xxxii 
This is the time when the group ILBE gained popularity. The website became notorious for 
uploading files, photos, cartoons, memes, all displaying and fomenting misogyny. Male users 
interacted on the website’s forum sharing their anger against women and uploaded vulgar 
photos and pictures of naked women. The TV programme “Kkach’ilnamnyŏ” aired complaints 
about women’s behaviour, pointing to a number of cases where they expected men to pay for 
their coffee, meals, expensive gifts, and movies. xxxiii  Name-calling was widespread, with 
women referred to as Kimch’inyŏ, taking advantage of men’s financial support while dating 
and/or after marriage.  
Some users of the ILBE website uploaded fabricated stories. In one of these, a man, allegedly 
injured on the street, asked a lady passing by for help and whether she could give him her 
jumper to cover up but she ignored him. The woman in the story was labelled as a typical 
Kimch’inyŏ, although the real story was the opposite. The lady actually helped the injured man, 
giving him her sweater. On Ilbe the story was distorted, creating the image of a selfish woman 
who only cares about her appearance and for the expensive sweater not to be ruined for the 
sake of an injured man.xxxiv Another infamous story which  circulated widely in 2015 was about 
two girls traveling back home from Hong Kong, and contracting MERS (Middle Eastern 
Respiratory Syndrome). The two girls were asked to take isolated seats on the airplane, but 
they refused to do so. Anger spread online about the two girls who were accused of ignoring 
public health considerations, and went viral in male discussion forums, including Ilbe.xxxv This 
story was also fabricated. Women witnessing such cases of witch-hunting started to mobilise, 
paving the way to the “Iamafeminist” movement. DC Inside was used for the creation of the 
Megalians’ (Megalia activists) discussion forum. As mentioned earlier, a group was opened on 
DC Inside combining the words MERS Gallery and Egalia’s daughters into Megalia. Megalians 
adopted a mirroring strategy. Whatever was "thrown at them" by ILBE activists, they “threw 
it back”, mirroring or reflecting it. When men used the derogatory term Kimch’inyŏ to refer to 
women they would call men back Kimch’inam.  
In the meantime, a number of other tragic events occurred. On the illegal website Soranet 
images and videos of sexual abuse were shared, as well as photos taken with hidden cameras 
in public toilets in 2015. Megalians raised 10 million won in a few hours to support MP Chin 
Sŏnmi’s legal effort to ban Soranet.xxxvi The website was finally banned following pressure 
from a feminist movement led by Chin Sŏnmi in 2016. A femicide occurred in a public toilet 
near the Gangnam subway station after midnight on 17th May 2016. The murderer confessed 
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to not having had any specific reason for his actions. The police investigation concluded that 
the man suffered from mental illness, although many contextualised this episode in the 
atmosphere of mounting online misogyny which ended up materialising offline. The day after 
the body was found, thousands of people gathered at the Gangnam station to mourn the victim. 
They left flowers and twenty thousand post-it messages, holding  a series of presentations/talks 
by women about their fears and complaints of the unfair treatment of women in Korean society. 
They also had campaigns of group walks at night. Many people joined the memorial event, 
commenting: "She was dead and I was lucky to survive", and "Men are potential criminals and 
women are potential victims".xxxvii At some point during the memorial event, a man wearing a 
pink elephant costume appeared with a message saying "Carnivorous animals are not bad, but 
the criminal".xxxviii The term “carnivorous” has another meaning in Korean referring to women 
as food. Some added a post-it on the pink elephant saying Ilbe-ch’ung (일베충, Ilbe-insect) 
which was mirroring of Kimch’inyŏ.  In the following days a group of men, allegedly Ilbe 
netizens, also joined the memorial event with posters saying: "Not all men are potential 
criminals". Eventually the two groups clashed.xxxix Since then, more young women have started 
studying feminism and the sales of books on feminism has dramatically increased since then.xl  
 
 
The case of Megalia 
 
Korea’s digital feminist activism takes various forms and does not constitute a cohesive group 
of users or members, nor does it advance a unified, coherent agenda. Egalia is a fictional land 
where “traditional” gender roles are reversed.xli Womad, a more radical off-shoot of Megalia, 
is a radical feminists’ online discussion group, whose name integrates "women" and "nomad". 
Megalia arose from the MERS Gallery group on the DC Inside platform on May 29th 2015. 
Users could upload their ideas, photos, video files and other users could remake or edit them 
or make parodies of them and circulate them on other websites. By June 2015 the Megalia 
group on Facebook had been closed and reopened three times due to the use of extremely vulgar 
and violent language by its users. A group called Megalia 4 was formed on Facebook in 
September 2015. As of mid-2020, the group is dormant and viewers can only see events and 
discussions up until 2016.  
In order to understand the ILBE-Megalians conflict and the specific language that they used, it 
is helpful to recall the cultural origins of those terms. The expressions Megalians responded to 
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were, among others, Doenchangnyŏ (된장녀, bean paste girl or Material girl) and later 
Kimch’inyŏ (김치녀) and Mumch’ung (Mum-insect or Mum-roaches) which are, in essence, 
stereotypes of Korean women in slightly different periods. All three terms are related to 
women’s vanity, obsession with physical appearances, and reliance on financial support from 
men (husband, partner or boyfriend). The origins of the Doenchangnyŏ expression is rooted in 
the experience of young college women who were born in the 1980s, who use the pocket money 
from their father to buy themselves a cheap lunch such as bean paste stew and rice 
(Doenchangtchike) while "splashing out" drinking coffee at Starbucks, at a time when coffee 
was more expensive than the meal itself. Korea’s first Starbucks coffee branch opened in the 
Ewha Womans University area in Seoul in 1999, soon after the Asian Financial Crisis. Before 
that time most Koreans were used to instant coffee with sugar and cream. Even coffee at a café 
was not as expensive as a Starbucks coffee at the time. Holding a mug of Starbucks coffee 
became a status symbol, implying sophistication and a globalized (in fact westernised) aura. 
Among the satires of the Doenchangnyŏ common at the time was “A day in the life of 
Doenchangnyŏ”. Supposedly, she routinely wears a branded dress and a LeSportsac totebag 
and gets on a more expensive bus to go to university. She eats breakfast at Dunkin Donuts, 
consisting of a donut and an Americano coffee, feeling like a New Yorker. During lunchtime, 
she looks down on other fellow students for eating a cheap lunch at the school cafeteria. If she 
can find a senior male student, she asks him to buy her lunch. The classroom is typically filled 
with her Chanel No. 5 perfume. After class she goes to the Lotte department store for some 
window shopping on the luxury brand floor, thinking of buying something using her father’s 
money. She imagines her future husband as a medical doctor driving a big luxury Sedan.xlii  
 
 
Table 1. Mirroring strategies by Megalia and Ilbe 
Words for misogyny  meaning Mirroring misogyny meaning 
Doenchangnyŏ 된장녀 Bean paste girl, Material 
girl 
Relying on or expecting 
men's financial support 
for luxury goods, 
typically a college girl 
who would eat cheap 
meals (beanpaste stew 
and rice) but have 
Starbucks coffee. 
Kkongch’inam 꽁치남 Mackerel pike man: free-
rider who likes to go 
Dutch (uncommon in 





Korean woman judging 






Korean man judging 
women by their 
appearances  
Men with small genitals  
Kaenyŏmnyŏ 개념녀 Wise women who are 
not like kimchi-nyo 
Kaenyŏmnom 개념놈 Wise men who are not 
like kimchi-nam 
Mum-ch’ung 맘충 Mummy-insect 
incompetent at raising 
children and only good 
at spending money; or 
mother with baby-
stroller and Starbucks 
coffee. 












Jasŭlach’i 자슬아치 Taking advantage 
sexually 
Dutch pay Dutch pay Loser pay, Ssipch’i 
씹치페이  
Loser pay, 10-cm pay 
Naktaenyŏ 낙태녀 Woman who have had 
abortion  
Ssach’witung 싸취퉁 Man who ran away after 
a woman gave birth to 
their child 
Sŏngkoe 성괴 Plastic surgery monster Sŏngkoe 성괴 Sex buyer  
Girlsplain Girls can explain to men Mansplain Men trying to explain 
things to women 




Kimch’nyŏ is the more “advanced” (age-wise) version of the young college girl in her mid-
twenties and thirties. She is regarded as a free-rider, expecting her boyfriend to support her 
expensive taste for Chanel bags or luxury branded gifts. She typically expects her boyfriend or 
husband to maintain her expensive taste throughout dating and marriage. A TV comedian 
captured the situation well: “Men, stand up and have a voice! I bought movie tickets. You buy 
a bag of popcorn. I bought you a luxury bag for your birthday but you gave me cross-stitch 
craft. Do not expect an anniversary gift for 100 days of us dating. My credit card instalment is 
not yet paid for the last gift.”xliii Another similar expression went as follows: “Do not look 
down at me because I do not have a car but paid for your luxury bag. I paid for coffee but why 
are you collecting stamps on your customer’s card? I spent my credit card for you but you 
wrote a Christmas card for me. Men, stand up until women pay for their meal!”xliv   
Another, possibly even worse, term is Bosŭlach’i 보슬아치. The word combines female sexual 
organs, bochi (vulgar term for female genitalia) and Byŏsŭlach’i, which indicates whoever 
abuses their power of a higher social status. The term describes a woman using her sexuality 
to receive some sort of benefits.  
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Mumch’ung is yet another term used to refer to married women not having a job but relying 
on their husbands’ financial support. A typical Mumch’ung’s image is a lady pushing an 
expensive baby stroller with one hand and carrying a Starbucks coffee in the other. Luxury, 
reliance on men, and lack of a job are all captured in this expression.  
Digital populism and feminist movements: never the twain shall meet? Neo-liberal 
globalization as a shared economic and cultural milieu 
 
How can we make sense of this episode of virtual social contention between Megalians and 
Ilbe? Are populist movements and feminist activists using the same tools to reach out to fellow 
like-minded digital users? While political scientists and sociologists have generously relied on 
populist leaders and the electoral support for populist movements and thus the term has gained 
widespread currency, scholars of feminist activism have resorted to expressions such as 
digital/cyber feminism or hashtag movements as they adopted various theoretical frameworks 
to make sense of specific movements and the online identities and debates.xlv Apart from a few 
notable exceptions,xlvi  there has been next to no overlap in the debates on populism and 
feminism in the early 21st century. This seems surprising, given that online users from both 
camps have engaged in heated debates online, often bordering on or crossing over into the legal 
debates which reinforce antagonistic us-versus-them dichotomies. In brief, web 2.0 and the rise 
of social media has reinforced “identity politics” and some of the prejudices underlying it.xlvii 
In its own way the groupness that stems from and drives identity politics contributes to 
reinforcing and solidifying pre-existing divides in society: gender identities are no exception 
here. As noted in the pages above, I do not suggest moral equivalence between the two camps. 
Yet, the strategies used in the contraposition bear resemblance to each other, which makes 
exploring and unpacking the pushback against misogyny through the lenses of the scholarship 
on populism especially useful in this case. Though historically and conceptually rooted in the 
experiences of European and North and Latin American countries, populism’s emphasis on 
“anti-elitism, sovereignty and homogeneity of the people”xlviii and the populists’ strategies in 
their performance using vulgar and antagonistic repertoires to provoke public resentment and 
grievances, new technologies, and network approaches resonate in the Korean context too.xlix 
This is evident in the case of Ilbe, as detailed in this article. Further, and perhaps surprisingly, 
on closer inspection the digital populists and the online feminists of the early 21st century may 
have more in common than either may be willing to concede and therefore a cross-fertilization 
between the two scholarly conversations may generate interesting insights.  
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The first shared aspect is the broader socio-economic environment in which the actions (and 
perceptions) of Megalians and Ilbe users are embedded. Identity politics has thrived as the rise 
in socio-economic inequalities has deepened polarization. Among the central insights of the 
scholarship on populism is the socio-economic context that has enabled this phenomenon to 
grow and flourish. l Among others, sociologist Rogers Brubakerli has asked why populism has 
gained in popularity at the current historical juncture. Populism is understood as a thin ideology 
which seeks to promote the general will of the people against representative politics. lii 
Although it can be either left- or right-wing, Mudde and Kaltwasser contend that populist 
movements tend to arise in response to crises. liii  Populism also emerges when ideologies 
converge to the centre, as Laclauliv and Mouffelv pointed out in their seminal works. Thus, a 
lack of polarization by representative organizations such as political parties (among others) 
leads individuals who often feel unrepresented to polarize. Francis Fukuyama also emphasises 
this trend in his recent work, where he stresses the role of the struggle for recognition and 
hatred of others in contemporary populist politics.lvi Social polarization based on the seemingly 
irreconcilable, ontological opposition between groups leads to the group’s self-articulation as 
victims of others (typically foreigners, religious, sexual, ethnic minority groups), with whom 
they see themselves as competing, and losing against in a very competitive globalized and 
unprotected neoliberal job market. Brubakerlvii observes that that populism not only emerges 
thrives in times of crises. Alongside the more commonly examined vertical axis, where the 
people oppose the elite, Brubaker helpfully examines a horizontal axis of inter-group 
competition, where populists draw a line between the majority, a supposedly homogeneous 
group, and a set of others, typically including foreigners,  migrants, and sexual minorities, who 
in their view benefit from privileges given them by the ruling elites. As I discuss below, both 
ILBE and Megalians emerged in the same environment of Korean socio-economic inequality 
and polarization, and the cultural dislocation and insecurities that this engendered. 
The second shared feature of these otherwise opposing groups is the tools used. Hate speech 
has become the web’s pandemic. Perceptions of injustice and victimization thrive in an era of 
the crisis of public information, knowledge and expertise. While Web 2.0 does not generate 
fake news per se, it spreads much faster in an environment which serves as an echo chamber. 
In his explanation Brubaker links the rise of populism to a broad set of structural 
transformations. Key to understanding this is a crisis of institutional mediation. Political parties’ 
role in connecting the state and the people has failed, and this failure has brought about a 
demand for direct democracy aided by the rapid improvement of social media, thus enhancing 
a digital hyper-connectivity. The mainstream media also take on a populist style through 
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simplification, dramatization, confrontation, negativity, emotionalization, personalization and 
visualization. lviii  Ordinary citizens are more isolated from the collective decision-making 
process and feel estranged from decision-making institutions, rightly or wrongly, by some of 
this power having been endowed to supranational institutions.  
Populism scholars have also paid increasing attention to rhetoric and speech, the use of raw, 
crude, rude language, and the overall lack of civility in online debates.lix Populists refer to 
“common sense” as a common set of beliefs, almost a (thin) ideology that allows leaders and 
ordinary people to communicate with each other in a rather unsophisticated yet relatable 
manner.lx Sensational and scandalous information attracts attention, regardless of whether the 
information shared is factually correct or not. The currency in these exchanges is the number 
of likes, shares, and retweets – in what is a virtually marketized environment. The rapid flow 
and exchange of information does not allow for pause and reflection, consistent with the 
demand for immediacy. The possibility of a hidden identity and anonymity has increased the 
sense of protection, and often impunity. Rapid advances in information and communication 
technology (ICT) enabled the early emergence of a networked society in Korea. Rapid and 
efficient e-government, the internet of things, and the success of global brands like Samsung 
and LG are part of Koreans’ daily lives and illustrate how technology has become part of 
Korean society. Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of mobile devices and 
applications. Koreans developed an early social network application, Cyworld, which many 
compare to early versions of Facebook and Instagram. Kakaotalk, the mobile messaging 
service, connects Koreans across all generations.  
However, there are also less savoury developments associated with new technologies: fringes 
of radical netizens have skilfully leveraged such IT advances to further their own agendas, 
consolidating in-group solidarity and promoting identity politics and an horizontal us-versus-
them dichotomy.lxi  
 
 
Unpacking Megalia: Radical online feminism in a neo-liberal age 
Megalia and the conflict with Ilbe, I argue, should not be understood as an episodic outburst of 
online violence, but as part of broader processes set in motion as early as the late 1990s. As 
examined in greater detail elsewhere, lxii  polarization in Korea emerged in the context of 
globalization and neoliberalism. Neo-liberal globalization has polarized society into a small 
group of very few very wealthy individuals in the world’s top 1% or 10% in terms of wealth 
concentration and the 99% or 90% of the poor, including an impoverished middle class which 
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never recovered from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis or the 2008 global recession. Although 
I do not claim that other, older or younger groups were not also affected by the crisis and the 
changes that it engendered, the generation born in the 1980s experienced the impact most 
directly. With inequality and polarization came an intra-generational divide along gender lines 
because the economic changes that followed the 1997 crisis also led to conflicts over social 
values, norms and expectations. This issue took on a Korea-specific shape to which I now turn. 
 
 
Polarization and inequality in Hell Chosŏn 
In “Feminism Reboot”, Son insightfully refers to the individualisation of financial disasters. 
lxiii  Since the Asian Financial Crisis, the Korean government introduced a flexible labour 
market which, among other things, meant extensive lay-offs of workers in their  mid-forties 
and older, and the loss of the prospect of job security for the new entrants into the job market. 
Professional life would be defined by a succession of short-term contracts one after the other. 
This serves as a stark and painful reminder that the Korean rapid economic development was 
achieved at the cost of cheap labour:  the 1997 financial crisis was “solved” with the IMF bail-
out and the resulting restructuring in line with neo-liberal market policies, creating vast layer 
of the precariat. It is in this light that the rise of misogyny can be understood. While the issue 
pre-existed the crisis, the outburst of frustration and anger of young men was less about women 
themselves and more about the structural problems that followed the financial crisis. Jobs were 
as scarce for men as they were for women. When women could not get a job, they had the 
option to marry into a better economic arrangement. Men therefore saw themselves as victims 
of feminist movements which had successfully pushed through the institutional reforms 
mentioned earlier in the article. Young men rationalized their struggle as the result of the 
structural imbalance which favoured women and, in a zero-sum game, disadvantaged them. In 
this logic it was not women that lacked rights or gender equality, but men. Filled with 
frustration and anger over their decreased social and economic status, they looked for venues 
for airing such frustrations, and online cafés came into existence right at this time, providing 
them with a playground for virtually socializing and discussing shared experiences of difficulty 
and pain.  Although the reasons apply as much to young Korean men as to women, the sources 
of stress were manifold. Competing with each other to survive in a highly competitive 
education system first to enter high ranking universities, and later the job market and even the 
“marriage market” adds considerable stress to Koreans from an early age. 
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Korean children grow up with their mothers urging them to work hard; their school 
performance is determined how much they spend at afterschool private lessons, which they are 
pressured to attend by parents determined to send their children to the best universities so that 
they can later secure well-paid employment. Another reason of competitive stress is English 
education. With globalisation, speaking English becomes an essential asset to enter university 
and acquire a decent job with a reasonably high income. To be “ahead of the curve”, children 
are sent to English-speaking kindergartens, which are three times more expensive than ordinary 
kindergartens. Private tuition by native speakers is designed to strengthen this competitive edge, 
although if all compete in the same way one wonders where the added value is. Instead, this is 
something that becomes expected, routinized. Many students are then sent to study abroad, as 
foreign degrees are perceived to provide further advantage in the competitive job market. For 
all this, the financial capability of the parents is crucial. All this existed before 1997; however, 
since the Asian financial crisis, economic polarisation has grown deeper in Korea, while a 
bifurcation occurred, with the wealthy becoming wealthier and the middle class’s financial 
capability shrinking.  
In this context, young men have become more insecure, as the uncertainties brought about by 
the financial crisis and its aftermath have been compounded by changes in social norms and 
values across Korean society. The effects of neoliberal globalization thus took on a very Korean 
distinctiveness. Traditionally, in Korean society men have been expected to cover large 
expenses. This may range from the cost of a date to a much more substantial purchase, like that 
of a flat or house. Because of the peculiarity of the Korean housing system, a tenant must 
deposit a very large sum upfront. Monthly rents are a very new development, and still not so 
common, dating back to as late as the early 2000s. The deposit for renting a flat is typically 
two thirds of the actual housing price. As this has become increasingly difficult to afford (and 
thus men are becoming unable to “provide”, as traditionally expected) young Korean men have 
begun delaying or giving up on dating, marrying, having a family, owning a property. The 
nickname for this “generation at a loss” used to be “Sampo” (삼포 meaning giving up three 
things: job, dating, marriage), and now it is “the N generation”, meaning giving up numerous 
things. Thus, along with the economic challenges brought by Korea’s integration in the global 
economy and global capitalism has come social dislocation resulting from a change in the 
social status and ability of men and women. Stress and frustration demanded a scapegoat, and 
a number of young men identified this in those they saw as their direct competitors on the job 
market: in this case, women. While this is to some extent understandable, the indicators below 
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show a different reality.lxiv Far from “stealing” jobs and opportunities from men, women also 
struggled in the same precarious economic environment. According to the World Economic 
Forum’s 2020 Global Gender Gap index, Korea ranks 108th out of total 153 countries, a far 
from impressive performance.lxv Women's economic participation and opportunity ranks 127th, 
Educational Attainment 101th, Health and Survival, 1th together with 38 other countries, 
Political Empowerment 79th. The report insightfully ends with suggestions how to improve the 
gender gap index in the report titled “The Gender Gap Country Accelerators: Female labour 
force participation, women in leadership position, closing gaps in wage and remuneration, 
building parity in emerging high-demand skills and jobs”. lxvi  Other data, such as on the 
employment rate (table 2), the unemployment rate (table 3), and the rate of employment of 
college graduate  by gender (table 4) reinforces the message that male deprivation, if it has 
occurred, has been relative (to itself, declining) rather than absolute and that women have not 
benefited from this.lxvii  
 
Table 2. Employment rate among economically activity population (2018) 
 Male (%) Female (%) 
Year 2018 2019 2018 2019 
Total 73.7% 73.5 52.9% 53.5 
Above 15 years old 7.2% 7.6 9.2% 9.0 
20-19 years old 62.6% 63.4 65.2% 64.3 
30-39 years old 92.9% 92.1 62.7% 64.1 
40-49 years old 94.2% 93.3 67.4% 66.7 
50-59 years old 89.3 88.6 65.0% 66.3 
Above 60s years old 53.6% 54.4 31.5% 33.6 
(Source: Statistics Korea 2020) 
 
Table 3. Unemployment rate 
 Male  female 
20-29 years old 9.7% 8.2% 
30-39 years old 3.3% 3.3% 
40-49 years old 2.4% 2.2% 
50-59 years old 2.8% 2.2% 
Above 60 years old 3.8% 2.9% 
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(Source: Statistics Korea 2019) 
 
Table 4. Employment of college, university graduates & over (000’s) 
 male female 
20-29 years old 866 1324 
30-39 years old 2425 1611 
40-49 years old 2248 1341 
50-59 years old 1479 628 
Above 60 years old 480 112 
(Source: Statistics Korea 2019) 
 
 
Identity politics and hate speech online: Misogyny and mirroring misogyny   
Technological advances and the emergence of web 2.0, such as the Social Networking Service 
(SNS, the acronym used in Korea to refer to social media), took place against the backdrop of 
the broader social, economic, even cultural changes discussed in the section above.  
As social and economic frustrations have grown, the demand for platforms for airing them has 
also increased. The rapid improvement of internet technology has created digital natives and a 
media ecology which provided an ideal environment for the emergence of digital populism. 
Angry marginalised people hid behind user anonymity to vent their resentment online and set 
up discussion groups of like-minded people. Actively targeting “the other” was the next step.  
In 2015 a news story appeared on the MERS Gallery reporting that female MERS patients 
refused to be physically isolated on an airplane from Hong Kong back to Korea. The gist of the 
comments was an accusation of the two girls of being selfish and horrendous women by 
spreading virus in public space. The comments soon took on misogynistic undertones. 
Eventually, the story turned out to be fake news. Female users on the platform started to react 
against misogyny by making a parody of the original photos and editing the original news 
replacing the reference to men with women. Megalians used the original misogynistic contents 
from ILBE and recreated the content replacing "female" with "male" and shared it among 
fellow female netizens. This mirroring misogyny strategy provoked a reaction by angry male 
users who turned out to be ILBE users. Ilbe is another web forum provided by the DC Inside 
web portal. A heated debate followed, where misogynistic comments by ILBE members were 
not moderated or blocked on MERS Gallery. The mounting cases of misogyny during the 
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MERS crisis encouraged digital feminists to deploy the mirroring misogyny approach more 
strategically and systematically. Mirroring misogyny started on Mers Gallery on the DC 
Inside.lxviii The mirroring strategy by certain female users started to be targeted in the comments 
by ILBE netizens. This caused a split among the users of the platform, which eventually led to 
the splintering of the Megalian group off DC Inside, who then created their own website 
(Megalian.com) on 6th June 2015. Megalians also set up their own account on Facebook and 
Twitter. As some of the messages went as far as inciting violence, the Megalian website was 
closed down, but it resurfaced under different names and forms on social media, including 
Facebook groups and Twitter accounts.  
Drawing on the derogatory terms that had been used to refer to women mentioned earlier in 
this article (and listed in Table 1 above), Megalians mounted a fierce response which entailed 
the use of a mirroring strategy, deploying terms such as Kimch’inam, Hannamch’ung (김치남 
Kimch’i man, 한남충 Korean man insect). When Megalia was warned by Facebook over the 
use of derogatory terms, it was accused by feminists of discrimination against Megalians, since 
it had allowed Ilbe users to freely use the equivalent expression Kimch’i woman (김치녀) on 
their Facebook page for many years. This exposed the hypocrisy of both the social media giant 
and society, as suddenly the use of the term Kimch’inam had drawn people's attention to the 
strategy of mirroring misogyny, which was regarded negatively, whilst online misogyny had 
been spreading uncensored. Some feminist users reacted to what they viewed as a 
discriminatory online environment where misogyny by male users was allowed but mirroring 
misogyny was not, responded by taking aggressive action, online and offline. Members of 
Megalia moved from platform to platform, using different social media where they shared 
messages with hashtags, liked, and retweeted each other's messages and posts. While female 
naked photos are regarded as acceptable on websites, when Womad members uploaded male 
nude photos, including male genitalia, it immediately triggered a police investigation. Those 
who posted them online were arrested in the following days. This sparked further public anger, 
especially among women, and cemented in-group solidarity among the Womad group users. In 
his article, Yu Min-seoklxix draws on Judith Butler’s theory of speechlxx to focus on how the 
use of language by Megalians was so central to the group’s mirroring misogyny strategy. Yu’s 
work sheds light on the cultural and sociological context of the Megalians' actions. He 
highlights the gendered imbalance of power throughout history, one aspect of which is that 
women felt they were being silenced and unable to rebut the belittling and derogatory 
expressions used to refer to them. Since such violence has been pervasive and embedded deeply 
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in society and culture, misogyny and the violence it perpetuates has become normalized, 
leaving women in a deeply imbalanced power relationship. For Megalians the mirroring 
strategy is about "talking back" and "speaking through" the pervasive misogyny.lxxi For years 
women had endured derogative terms such as Kimch’inyŏ and Doenjang-nyŏ. Similarly, Ilbe 
users also repeatedly used the expression Samilhan (once in three days) meaning "women 
should be beaten every three days". The Megalians finally retorted through mirrored misogyny 
by uttering Sumshwilhan (once every breath): "men should be beaten up every time they 
breathe". lxxii   
Such parody can therefore overcome misogyny not from a victim’s perspective but through a 
pay-back strategy whereby the original image of misogyny is recreated and adjusted to the next 
context.lxxiii As Jang points out, Megalia’s mirroring misogyny strategy articulated a strong 
reaction against the pervasive misogyny of Korean society. A reaction had been mounting prior 
to the emergence of the group, but it was only thanks to the work of digital natives that the 
issue was truly exposed and brought to the attention of the wider public. As unpleasant, vulgar, 
polarising and ultimately divisive as the strategy was, the mirroring strategy vividly and 
successful exposed the misogynistic culture among some Korean men by "throwing back" – 
mirroring – the very same terminology and demeaning attitude towards them. The aim of 
Megalians, and of the feminist movement behind it, was to awaken the silent majority that had 
been aware of the issue and try and build a broader coalition with other women who felt the 
same way and shared the same views. They reached out to famous male politicians, newspaper 
columnists, and writers, asking that they identify themselves as feminists and/or out themselves 
as victims of gender inequality.  
Jang Min-ji notes that in order to understand Megalia we need to embed it in the current 
configuration of the media ecosystem, defined by social media. lxxiv Internet culture allows  
digital natives to share existing content, and to create new content which is then rapidly shared 
and spread by various social network systems. Thus, digital natives are not just consumers but 
producers and providers. Jang also points out that digital natives are the daughters of workers 
who were laid off in late 1990s during and in the aftermath of the financial crisis. For them, 
their fathers were no longer the only breadwinners in the household. They grew up in an 
environment where there was less disparity in the roles of wives and husbands. Such social 
changes gave rise to different perceptions of gender roles than the traditional role of women in 
Korean society. Inequalities did not disappear though. After returning home from work, the 
daughters saw that it was still their mothers who were engaged in housework, not their fathers. 
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This contradiction between public and private roles also fuelled resentment among young 
women growing up in the late 1990s and 2000s.  
When Megalians took action with their mirroring strategy, male users started to feel 
uncomfortable and upset. Some even reported Megalia to the police. On Wikipedialxxv and 
Namuwiki, lxxvi  Megalians and Womad are still described as criminal groups. Criticism of 
Megalia grew because of its perceived radicalism and the users’ use of vulgar words mirroring 
misogyny, although similar terms, when used by men, were usually considered jokes. Chang 
Hye-young, a Youtuber and documentary film producer who recently became a member of 
parliament for the Justice Party in the 2020 parliamentary elections, uploaded a video where 
she discussed her views of Megalians.lxxvii Chang contends that they contributed positively to 
the fight for gender equality. Structural gender inequality had been prevalent, and women could 
not even express their discomfort with the pervasive misogyny, but it was not until the 
Megalians’ activities that society even noticed this pervasive misogyny. Thus, radical feminist 
activism like Megalians' and Womad's belatedly brought some welcome changes. Yet it also 
attracted fierce criticism beyond its widespread resort to vulgar expressions. Disagreement on 
a number of issues caused frictions and splits among Megalians, leading to the creation of 
Womad as a more radical splinter-group. Specifically, disagreements over sexual minority 
issues arose among members. Some Megalians would accept lesbians as members but 
vigorously reject and insult gays or transgender women. Eventually, the group splintered off 
and formed Womad in January 2016. Womad activists were even arrested for sharing their 
opinions and desires to kill their sexually harassing bosses at work.lxxviii Some feminists started 
declaring that they were feminists but not Megalians. Megalians' and Womad’s revolutionary 
anti-misogyny activities were successful in gaining attention and brought about a change in the 
perception of pervasive misogyny in Korean society. However, their rapid decline revealed 
splits inside Korea’s feminist movement and also spoke to the sporadic activities typical of 
digital populism, with a rapid rise and similarly swift demise in online activities.lxxix Regardless 
of their short-lived nature, both groups speak to what, in her insightful work on misogyny in 
the era of post-feminism, Chung In-kyung has called the human desire to be recognised by 
others.lxxx Recognised by their “significant other” (ILBE), Megalians have  been praised in this 
sense by many feminists and feminist researchers.lxxxi It was the Megalians who finally stood 







The article has examined the case study of Megalia and its splinter group Womad as examples 
of radical online feminist groups active during 2015-2016. The flaring up of intense discussions 
and the online conflict between ILBE and Megalia/Womad was overall short-lived. However, 
it is illustrative of broader socio-economic and cultural divisions in Korean society.  
The study of online feminism, also in a Korean context, has been typically approached by 
feminist scholarship drawing on insights from media and communication studies, literature and 
linguistics, and social movements studies.lxxxii In this article I have applied insights from the 
scholarship on populism to explain the rise and evolution of Megalia/Womad as a group that 
directly confronted online misogynists. While the core issue for Megalians was the fight against 
the misogyny pervasive in Korean society and now the internet, I have argued that the group 
and its actions are best understood not in isolation or as a set of sporadic outbursts of online 
anger, nor as a fringe, radical and relatively short-lived online group, but rather as part of a 
dynamic of contention (online and offline) between different segments of Korean society. In 
the analysis I have focused on Megalia’s mirroring strategy as an example of the intense, but 
also episodic nature of online feminist activism. The advantage of bringing the scholarship of 
populism into the study of a feminist movement was two-fold: first, Brubaker’s focus on 
horizontal dichotomies in contemporary populism seems particularly fitting here. The article 
showed how the actions of Megalia and its main online opponent Ilbe were in the end co-
constitutive. Secondly, the article argued that the study of Megalia should be embedded in 
longer-term processes of structural transformation of Korean society, namely globalization and 
the neo-liberal policies that had undermined job security by introducing a flexible job market; 
the policies and legislative changes introduced by successive progressive governments that on 
the one hand contributed to gender equality, and on the other rendered the grievances and 
insecurities of existing social groups even more acute. 
In sum, the conflict between Megalia and Ilbe was as much over gender and evolving gender 
roles as it was about the socio-economic issues that affected a particular generation, that of 
men and women born in the 1980s, who had grown up as South Korea opened up to and 
integrated in the global economy. The neo-liberal policies that were introduced as part of the 
IMF structural adjustment package shook some of the certainties of Korean society, including 
expectations over job security and social norms. Building on this, future research should further 
explore the emerging divides within Korea’s feminist movement, including those that have 
stemmed from its ambiguous or even outright problematic attitude towards homophobia and 
transphobia. Another line of enquiry could explore intra- and inter-generational conflicts in 
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Korean society and the way in which the MeToo movement arose against a growing inter-
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